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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
ALD-269 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-4402 
___________ 
 
THOMAS BARNDT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL WENEROWICZ; JOHN E. WETZEL; GALLOWAY, Mr. R____; 
WEBSTER, MR._____; LUQUIS, MR. J____; WILLIAMS, MR. J__K; CRANE, 
MR.___; MEJIAS, MR._____; DORINA VARNER, MS., individually and in their 
official capacities; WEAVER; BOGAN; HANNIBAL; HARDNETT; 
SERGEANT  LACY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 15-cv-02729) 
District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 1, 2017 
Before:  MCKEE, JORDAN and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed June 19, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Thomas Barndt appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  We will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 
of this case, we describe its history only briefly.  In June 2015, Barndt, an inmate 
confined at SCI-Graterford, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
fourteen prison employees in their individual and official capacities.  He alleged that 
defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by converting his 
family contact visit to non-contact; denying him fresh air, out of cell exercise, and 
showers for twenty-eight days while he was housed in the Special Needs Unit; placing 
him in a psychiatric observation cell without his first seeing a psychiatrist; confiscating 
two photos of his grandson as contraband and issuing a misconduct for possession of the 
photos; continuing to assert that the photos were contraband even after the misconduct 
charge was dropped; and confiscating his soup while he was housed in the Special Needs 
Unit.   
 In August 2015, defendants Wenerowicz, Wetzel, Luquis, Williams, Crane, and 
Varner filed a motion to dismiss Barndt’s complaint, which the District Court 
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subsequently granted for all moving defendants with the exception of Luquis.1  In April 
2016, the remaining nine defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the 
District Court granted by order entered on November 8, 2016.  Shortly thereafter, Barndt 
filed a motion to alter judgment, which was denied by the District Court by order entered 
on November 22, 2016.  Barndt appeals. 
II.  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Barndt has been 
granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this appeal for 
possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We may summarily affirm 
under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 if the appeal lacks substantial merit.  We 
exercise plenary review over a district court order for summary judgment.  Giles v. 
Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
                                              
1 Although Barndt does not expressly appeal this District Court order, we have 
nevertheless reviewed it and conclude that dismissal is appropriate with regard to: several 
of the named defendants for lack of personal involvement, see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); his interference with grievance procedure claims, see 
Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison 
grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner.”); his allegation that 
Williams confiscated two photos of his “light-skinned” grandson, see Tillman v. Lebanon 
Cty. Correc. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d. Cir. 2000) (finding no constitutional 
violation where prison’s grievance procedure provides adequate post-deprivation 
remedy); and his claim that he did not see a psychiatrist before being placed in a 
psychiatric observation cell, see, e.g., Gay v. Turner, 994 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(per curiam) (holding that temporary transfers, unlike indefinite psychiatric commitment, 
do not constitute major changes in conditions of confinement amounting to grievous loss, 
which would require procedural protections).  
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The moving party “bears 
the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 
identifying those portions” of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 
dispute of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the 
moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party then must present specific facts that 
show there is a genuine issue for trial.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), (e)(2); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
III. 
 Barndt alleges that the defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause by converting his contact visit with his family, 
including two granddaughters, to a non-contact visit.  He claims that this occurred after 
two of the defendants witnessed him shaking hands with a Jamaican prisoner.  
Defendants assert that the visit was converted because of a notation in Barndt’s file that 
indicated that he was not allowed to have contact with minors. 
 To pursue an equal protection claim under a “class of one” theory, Barndt must 
show that prison officials treated him differently from similarly situated individuals 
without a rational basis for the different treatment.  Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 
U.S. 562, 564 (2000); PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 114 (3d Cir. 2013).  We 
agree with the District Court that Barndt fails to establish a viable claim under the “class 
of one” theory as he does not allege the existence of similarly situated prisoners who 
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were treated differently, and fails to provide evidence for the allegation that defendants 
intentionally revoked his contact visit due to his relationship with Jamaican prisoners.   
Moreover, there was a rational basis for defendants to revoke the contact visit because 
there was a notation in Barndt’s file indicating that he was not permitted to have contact 
with minors.2  See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984) (“[T]he Constitution 
does not require that detainees be allowed contact visits when responsible, experienced 
administrators have determined, in their sound discretion, that such visits will jeopardize 
the security of the facility.”)  Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment on this claim. 
IV. 
 Barndt’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim for the denial of out 
of cell exercise and showers for twenty-eight days fares no better.  The Eighth 
Amendment imposes duties on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of 
confinement” and “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and 
medical care.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citations omitted).  To 
establish an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, Barndt must show that 
(1) the deprivation alleged was objectively, “sufficiently serious” such that the prison 
officials’ acts or omissions resulted in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of 
                                              
2 Defendants concede in their motion for summary judgment that the notation may have 
been added to Barndt’s prison record in error.  However, this does not impact our 
determination that at the time of the visit, there was a rational basis to convert the contact 
visit. 
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life’s necessities”; and (2) that the prison officials exhibited a “deliberate indifference” to 
his health and safety. Id. at 834 (citations omitted).  However, where conditions are not 
“cruel and unusual” but merely “restrictive and even harsh,” they do not violate the 
Eighth Amendment but rather “are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their 
offenses against society.”  Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).   
 This Court has never extensively addressed in a precedential opinion when a 
deprivation of outdoor exercise amounts to a substantial deprivation.  However, other 
Courts of Appeals have suggested that when making this determination, courts should 
consider the totality of the circumstances, including, but not limited to, the length of the 
deprivation, the availability of recreation within the cell, and whether the inmate suffered 
any ill health effects as a result of the deprivation.  See Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 
446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995); 
Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1983).   
 We agree with the District Court that in this instance, the temporary denial of out 
of cell exercise for twenty-eight days was not a substantial deprivation.  See, e.g., 
Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding denial of yard privileges 
for no more than ninety days not cruel and unusual punishment); May v. Baldwin, 109 
F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding “temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no 
medical effects is not a substantial deprivation”); Knight v. Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093, 
1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding denial of outdoor recreation for thirteen days not cruel and 
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unusual punishment); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding 
lack of exercise constitutes a constitutional violation “[w]here movement is denied and 
muscles are allowed to atrophy, [and] the health of the individual is threatened”).  Barndt 
has not demonstrated that he suffered ill effects or sought medical care at the end of the 
twenty-eight day period, and he concedes in his deposition testimony that he had the 
space to exercise in his cell.  
 We also conclude that the District Court correctly determined that the denial of 
showers for a temporary period of time does not rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation.  Barndt has not demonstrated that he suffered any ill effects from not being 
able to shower for twenty-eight days, and the record shows that he had a sink and running 
water in his cell, allowing him to wash daily if he desired.  See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 
162, 168 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that denial of showers for three days was not cruel and 
unusual punishment as prisoner had other ways to clean himself). 
 Because Barndt has not established that defendants acted with deliberate 
indifference to his health or safety, and that they knew he would face a substantial risk of 
serious harm, the District Court properly granted summary judgment on Barndt’s Eighth 
Amendment claim. 
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V. 
 Barndt’s remaining claims are equally unpersuasive.  With respect to his Fourth 
Amendment claim for the confiscated soup and photos of his grandson,3 the District 
Court correctly concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches of 
prison cells or seizures of property within them.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
536 (1984) (“We hold that the Fourth Amendment has no applicability to a prison cell.”).  
With regard to his due process claim, the District Court properly determined that the 
availability of a post-deprivation grievance procedure afforded him sufficient due process 
in connection with his confiscated property.  Id. at 533 (“[A]n unauthorized intentional 
deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the 
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a 
meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”).  Although Luquis’ 
continued characterization of the confiscated photos as contraband after the misconduct 
charge had been dropped may have been incorrect, Barndt availed himself of the 
available post-deprivation grievance procedures, and he has failed to show how Luquis’ 
actions undermined the adequacy of those procedures. 
                                              
3 Barndt alleges that Luquis, the Unit Manager for the Special Needs Unit, allowed two 
prison officials to confiscate photos of his grandson because the photos showed Barndt’s 
“light-skinned” grandson who “resemble[d] a Jamaican.”  Barndt claims that he was told 
the photographs were property of another inmate, and he was issued a misconduct for 
possession of contraband.  Barndt filed a grievance, and the misconduct charge was 
dropped.  However, he claims that Luquis continued to say the photos were contraband, 
and his photos were never returned. 
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VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no substantial question 
presented by this appeal, and will thus summarily affirm the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to the defendants.  Barndt’s motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied.    
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